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May-June, 1957
ONE YEAR REVIEW OF CORPORATIONS, PARTNERSHIP,
AND AGENCY*
By WILLSON HURT
Associate Professor of Law, University of Denver
Corporations:
The case of Miller v. Hepnert is the sequel to Hepner v. Miller.'
The Supreme Court in Hepner v. Miller had held "that a court has
no power, in the absence of a permissive statute, to dissolve a going
solvent corporation; to appoint a receiver to sell its assets, and di-
vide the proceeds of such sale among the stockholders. ' '8 The
court ordered the case remanded, with directions to discharge the
receiver and to dismiss the action.
Miller v. Hepner involved the question whether the trial court
was correct in fixing: (a) the receiver's fee at $100 a month for the
twelve months he acted as such, (b) $750 as the fee for the receiv-
er's attorney, and (c) the fee of appraisers retained by the receiver
to appraise the corporate real estate. The second question was
whether such expenses should be charged against the plaintiff
stockholders who brought the action for the appointment of the re-
ceiver. The trial court decided all these issues against the plaintiffs.
Held, judgment modified by reducing the receiver's fee and his at-
torney's fee by fifty per cent. The supreme court held with the trial
court that such fees were chargeable to plaintiff stockholders, who
had improperly obtained the appointment of the receiver. But, "As
to the fees for appraisal of the real estate, it is to be observed that
this appraisal was premature on the part of the receiver and it is
only fair and just that he be directed to pay this item."
4
In Fehr v. Hadden,5 plaintiffs were stockholders in a mutual non-
profit corporation organized under the Colorado statutes for the
purpose of acquiring and distributing water for domestic purposes
in Jefferson County. All water users were required to own stock in
the corporation. The plaintiffs brought action against the corpora-
tion and its directors, to have an election of directors declared in-
valid on the grounds: (1) that certain record stock owners allowed
to vote at the election were building contractors, and should not
have been allowed to vote, because they might dispose of their stock
to purchasers of homes, and that they, therefore, were not bona fide
stockholders for the purpose of voting; and (2) that certain record
stockholders were not bona fide equitable owners of stock because
they had contracted to sell the stock to others, and consequently
should not have been allowed to vote. The trial court entered judg-
ment for the defendant directors. Held, judgment affirmed. (a) The
Colorado statute' provides that, unless the articles of incorporation
of a Colorado corporation shall provide to the contrary, every share-
holder of record is entitled at every shareholders' meeting to one
* This article conclude% the review of cases decided between Nov. 1, 1955 and Jan. 1, 1957.
For six other annual review articles see 34 DICTA 69-122 (1957).
1 132 Cola. 395, 292 P.2d 968 (1955).
130 Cola. 243, 274 P.2d 818 (1954); see Note, 32 DICTA 314 (1955).
S 130 Colo. at 246, 274 P.2d at 819.
4 132 Colo. at 399, 292 P.2d at 970.
s 300 P.2d 533 (1956).
eColo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 31-2-7 (1953).
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vote for every share standing in his name on the books of the cor-
poration. There was nothing to indicate that the articles of incor-
poration provided for any limitation on voting rights. Consequently,
the building contractors' intention to sell their stock at some time in
the future did not disqualify the stock from being voted. (b) The
Colorado stock transfer act expressly permits a corporation to "rec-
ognize the exclusive right of a person registered on its books as the
owner of shares ... to vote as such owner. . .. -7 And the same act
contains the definition: "(i) 'Title' means legal title and does not
include a merely equitable or beneficial ownership or interest."8
Therefore, the mere fact that certain stockholders of record had con-
tracted to sell their stock would not preclude them from voting that
stock.
The case of Colorado Builders' Supply Co. v. Hinman Brothers
Construction Co. involved the question of what constitutes doing
business within the state by a foreign corporation so as to make it
amenable to process served on its employees within the state. The
defendant corporation, an Illinois corporation, had not qualified to
do business in Colorado, nor had it designated an agent for process.
It manufactured heavy earth-moving machinery in its plants in
Illinois and Georgia, and sold its products in Colorado, and portions
of Nebraska and Wyoming, through an exclusive distributor, the
plaintiff, a corporation.
Id. § 31-9-3.
* Id. § 31-9-21.
9 304 P.2d 892 (1956).
A 4nnouncin
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The plaintiff was the defendant's distributor for just less than
a month, from May 1, 1953, to May 29, 1953, and from the latter date
to October 12, 1953, the defendant had no distributor in Colorado.
In September 1953, one Murphy became the defendant's district rep-
resentative. Murphy's first efforts were toward finding a suitable
distributor fo his company, and on October 12, 1953, Liberty Com-
pany became the distributor in Colorado. Murphy made his services
available to Liberty in providing the personnel with a working
knowledge of the equipment and in giving sales training to Liberty
employees. On some occasions, he accompanied Liberty salesmen in
meeting prospective customers. At all times following his appoint-
ment, Murphy spent a very substantial portion of his time outside
Colorado, although he lived in Denver because of its central loca-
tion. He made written reports of his work to the defendant corpora-
tion. He was paid a fixed salary by the defendant, drew no com-
missions, and was not supplied with an office.
In addition to the district representative, the defendant corpora-
tion employed one Slade as a service engineer. The area to which
he was assigned comprised all the United States west of and includ-
ing Texas, Oklahoma, Kansas, Iowa, Minnesota, Wisconsin, as well
as portions of Canada, Alaska, and Hawaii. His duties were to train
and counsel distributors on problems of maintenance, repair, and
upkeep of machines made by defendant. He worked under direct
orders from the factory, and was in no way responsible to the dis-
tributor. When Liberty became a distributor in Colorado, its em-
ployees were not familiar with the equipment and had to be trained
to service and maintain it. Slade occasionally went with the distrib-
utor's service man on a repair job, because the distributor's em-
ployee was too inexperienced to locate the trouble with the equip-
ment. Slade was paid a salary by the defendant, and the defendant
was not reimbursed by the distributor in the few instances in which
Liberty called upon Slade to assist in repair work.
The plaintiff served process, in an action in personam against
defendant corporation, on both Murphy and Slade, referring to each,
in the return of service, as "agent and principal employee" of the
defendant. The defendant moved to quash the service of process on
the grounds: (1) that it was not engaged in business in Colorado;
and (2) that the persons served were not agents for accepting serv-
ice of process. After hearing evidence, the trial court determined
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that the defendant corporation was not "doing business" within
Colorado so as to be amenable to process served within the state.
Held, judgment affirmed.
In Western Homes, Inc. v. District Court,"° it was held: "A cor-
poration can conspire and can commit a tort."" The alleged tort was
common law deceit.
Partnership:
The only partnership case found is Bennett v. Gardner.12 In that
case the plaintiff brought an action against his former partner for
an accounting. He alleged a loan of $800 to the former partner and,
on information and belief, alleged that $5,000 was the approximate
amount due for assets sold and unaccounted for by the former part-
ner. The trial court was unsatisfied with the account filed by the
defendant on court order, because the court considered it incom-
plete. The defendant's counsel claimed that the defendant could
not submit any other records. Thereupon, on motion of the plain-
tiff, the court entered judgment for the plaintiff for $5,800 as prayed
for in the complaint, "since any other course of action appeared use-
less." 1" Held, reversed and remanded to the trial court, with direc-
tion to vacate the judgment against defendant and grant a new trial.
It was encumbent on the plaintiff to establish his case by evidence
of the amount due under the accounting, "and the court cannot,
without proof, assume that the amount due plaintiff is the sum
named in his complaint."'
4
In the supreme court's report of the Bennett case, it is diffi-
cult to discover whether the court considered that either a real part-
nership or a real joint adventure had been formed. It speaks of "the
so-called partnership agreement." Assuming that partnership law
was involved, the case poses a real problem for the dormant part-
ner who asks for a court accounting, on dissolution, from the active
partner who was in entire charge of the business. When the active
partner refuses to file a complete account as ordered by the trial
court, is the court powerless to give relief to the dormant partner?
Maybe the trial court could cite the active partner for contempt of
court, but that would not benefit the dormant partner in a pecuniary
way. Strangely, not a single case is cited by the Supreme Court for
its holding, nor did it cite the Uniform Partnership Act,1 adopted
in Colorado.
Agency:
Cases concerning the relationship of principal and agent, and
master and servant, are included here, but workmen's compensation
cases are omitted.
Three cases deal with real estate brokers. The first is McCul-
lough v. Thompson.6 In that case, the defendants, the owners of cer-
tain real property, listed the property with the plaintiffs, real estate
10 133 Colo. 304, 296 P.2d 460 (1956).
11 Id. at 310, 296 P.2d at 463.
"133 Colo. 33, 291 P.2d 705 (1955).
uId. at 37, 291 P.2d at 707.
14 Id. at 38, 291 P.2d at 708.
"Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 104-1-1 to 43 (1953).
1 133 Colo. 352, 295 P.2d 221 (1956).
SACHS-LILLOR- CORPORATIOn SEHLS- ALPIBE 5-3422
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agents, for sale at a certain price. The defendants agreed in writing
to pay the agents a commission of five per cent if a purchaser ready,
willing, and able to buy the property on the terms prescribed was
found within sixty days. The agents did find such a purchaser with-
in sixty days, but the defendants refused to go through with the
sale. Thereupon, the plaintiffs sued for the agreed commission, with
interest, and obtained a judgment for that amount. Held, judgment
affirmed. "Under the pertinent statute ... they were entitled to
their commission."'17
In Ginsberg v. Frankenberg,' the defendant gave a non-exclus-
ive listing of his property to the plaintiff, a real estate broker who
was also an attorney. The contract of listing was drafted by the
plaintiff, and provided for a commission to the plaintiff if he found
a purchaser willing to pay the amount asked by the defendant.
Plaintiff was unable to find such a purchaser. Defendant subse-
quently sold the property through another agent, and paid the lat-
ter a commission. Plaintiff sued the defendant, claiming he had
earned a commission. In the trial court, after the plaintiff had put
in his evidence, the defendant moved for a nonsuit and dismissal
of the complaint. This motion was granted. Held, judgment af-
firmed. The supreme court stated that if there was any ambiguity
in the contract, it must be construed against the writer. The court
then went on to say: "Recovery in this case is not only barred by
the decisions of this court, but by .... " the statute."
In Heady v. Tomlinson,2 0 a real estate broker brought action
to recover a commission for effecting a sale of real estate for the
defendant. The defendant had been negotiating with one Larreau
regarding selling to Larreau certain wheat land owned by the de-
fendant. Later, Larreau introduced the plaintiff to defendant; and
upon the plaintiff's representation to the defendant that he would
have some cash buyers on the defendant's land the next day, the
defendant agreed to allow the plaintiff to show the land for sale
and to pay a commission to the plaintiff if a sale was made. Larreau
later decided to buy the land and he informed the plaintiff of his
desire. The plaintiff showed the defendant's land to certain pros-
pective cash buyers, but a sale did not materialize. The plaintiff
rr Id. at 355, 295 P.2d at 222 [citing Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 117-2-1 (1953)].
18 133 Colo. 382, 295 P.2d 1036 (1956)..
1Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 117-2-1 (1953).
°299 P.2d 120 (1956).
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then informed the defendant of Larreau's offer, and the defendant
informed the plaintiff that he would accept Larreau's offer. Sub-
sequently a contract of sale was entered into between the defend-
ant and Larreau, at which time the plaintiff was present. Plaintiff
demanded his commission from the defendant, but the defendant
refused to pay it, on the basis that he, and not the plaintiff, had
produced the buyer. The case was tried to the court without a jury,
and judgment was entered for the plaintiff. Held, judgment re-
versed and the cause remanded with directions to enter judgment
for the defendant. The plaintiff did not produce a purchaser. De-
fendant and the purchaser had already been negotiating for the
sale of the property, and plaintiff did nothing to induce the buyer
to purchase the property.
In Weick v. Rickenbaugh Cadillac Co.,2' suit was brought
by the administrator of the estate of decedent to recover commis-
sions which plaintiff claimed that his decedent had earned while
employed as sales manager for the defendant automobile distribut-
ing company. The contract between the plaintiff's intestate and the
company was silent as to when the plaintiff's commission would be
deemed earned. Under the contract, the plaintiff's intestate was to
receive a certain per cent of the sale price of all cars sold by the
defendant company, as his commission as sales manager. Plaintiff
contended that the contract included cars sold during his intestate's
lifetime but delivered afterwards. The practice of the defendant
company was to pay the commissions on the fifteenth day of the
month following the last month of each quarter. The trial court held
that the plaintiff's intestate was not entitled to commissions on cars
sold prior to his death but delivered afterwards. Held, reversed.
"The basic error lies in the failure of the trial court to recognize
the distinction between the time when a commission is earned and
the time when it may become due and payable.
22
Garden of the Gods Village v. Hellman21 involved the distinc-
tion between the relationship of principal-agent and the relation-
ship of employer-independent contractor. Defendant corporation
was engaged in developing its real property for the purpose of sub-
dividing the land into lots to be sold to the public. Heyn was presi-
dent of the corporation and controlled practically all of its issued
stock. The corporation, through Heyn, employed two brothers at a
stipulated wage per hour to blast out some large rocks that were
on the land. One of the brothers suggested to Heyn that about a
hundred holes should be bored and then fired with light loads of
blasting material. However, to save cost, Heyn directed that only
four or five holes be bored and then fired with heavy loads. As a
result of the brothers' following Heyn's directions, plaintiff's nearby
building was materially damaged by concussion from the blasting.
The plaintiff obtained a verdict and judgment against the defend-
ant corporation. Held, judgment affirmed. The court first found
that the brothers were not independent contractors but were ser-
vants of the corporation, and "it was liable for any damage result-
21 303 P.2d 685 (1956).
= Id. at 687.
' 133 Colo. 286, 294 P.2d 597 (1956).
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ing from their operations .... ",24 The court then observed that the
work was of an inherently dangerous character, and in such a case
an employer cannot evade liability by engaging an independent
contractor.
The case of Radosevich v. Pegues25 involved the question wheth-
er an attorney, who has entered his appearance on behalf of a party
to an action, may compromise and settle his client's claim without
the knowledge and consent of his client. The facts are somewhat
involved, but it will suffice for our purposes to say that the su-
preme court followed settled Colorado authority in stating that the
attorney "may not compromise his client's cause without express
authority."2 6
Two master and servant cases were decided by the Colorado
Supreme Court. (Workmen's compensation cases are omitted here.)
One of the master-servant cases, interesting on its facts, is Lom-
bardy v. Stees.27 Defendant was the owner of the Pioneer Hotel and
bar in Steamboat Springs, and one Brasier was in his employ as
bartender. Brasier was instructed not to serve any patron who had
had too much to drink. The plaintiff entered the bar one night,
drank several glasses of beer, and then argued with the bartender
over whether the latter had given him the proper change. The
plaintiff claimed that, later, the bartender asked him to leave, and
when he was a few feet from the door the bartender came from
behind the bar and beat him with a golf club handle. The bartender
claimed that the plaintiff called him a "dirty name" and that he
thought the plaintiff was looking for trouble with him personally
and not with the patrons of the bar. The plaintiff sued the defend-
ant and the bartender for his injuries. The first trial was before a
jury, which failed to reach a verdict. Another trial was had with
no service being had on the bartender and no appearance being
made for him. The court instructed the jury as to acts of the ser-
vant entirely for his own purposes being beyond the scope of his
employment, and added:
"The fact, however, if it be a fact, that at the time of
and in the perpetration of the wrongful act complained of,
the servant was combining some private purpose of his
own with the business of his master is not of itself suffi-
cient to take the wrongful act outside of the scope of the
authority and employment, and the master will not on that
account be relieved from liability." '28
Counsel for the defendant objected to the instruction, but was over-
ruled. The jury brought in a verdict for the plaintiff for $20,000,
and judgment was entered thereon. Held, judgment reversed and
the cause remanded with directions to dismiss the complaint. The
supreme court stated that the above-quoted instruction was erron-
eous, because there was no evidence in the case to show that the
bartender was acting partly in behalf of his master.
24 Id. at 294, 294 P.2d at 601.
11 133 Colo. 148, 292 P.2d 741 (1956).
= Id. at 152, 292 P.2d at 743 (dictum).
132 Colo. 570, 290 P.2d 1110 (1955).
2 Id. at 575, 290 P.2d at 1112.
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It seems to us that the supreme court was somewhat naive in
its examination of some of the evidence. For instance, the court
said: "There was a stick, apparently the handle of a golf club, in
the bar and it is not shown by the evidence that it was used for
any purpose in the operation of the bar as such."29 Would it not be
more realistic to say that the stick was kept there, behind the bar,
for some useful purpose connected with the operation of the bar?
It certainly was not kept there for playing golf, since it was useless
as a golf club.
Whether the bartender was acting within the scope of his em-
ployment was properly a jury question, and since the evidence on
that point was conflicting, the direction given by the trial court
was proper. The local jury was in a much better position to deter-
mine who was telling the truth than was the appellate court, which
read the abstract of record and the briefs in Denver.
A case equally interesting on its facts as the preceding one, but
not as doubtfully decided is Bidlake v. Shirley Hotel.30 There the
plaintiff drove his car up to the entrance of the Shirley-Savoy Ho-
tel, operated by the defendant in Denver, preparatory to register-
ing as a guest. He was asked by the defendant's uniformed em-
ployee if he desired his car stored. Plaintiff answered in the affirm-
ative and gave the car keys to the employee, a night porter. In-
stead of taking the car to the garage, the employee used it for a
"joy-ride" and damaged it. Upon the plaintiff's recovering the car
the next day, valuable personal property had been taken from the
glove compartment. Plaintiff sued the defendant hotel for the
damage to the car and the loss of the personal property. Defendant
set up in defense that the employee had no authority to take the
plaintiff's automobile to a garage and that the employee converted
the automobile to his own use. The defendant gave evidence tend-
ing to show: that it was not the practice of employees of the hotel
to take guests' cars to the nearby garage for storage; that the door-
man ordinarily was the person who would take the car keys of a
guest who wished his car stored; that the doorman would give the
guest a claim-check and would call the garage to have it send a
shag-boy to come for the car; that the employees had been instruct-
ed that only the supervisor and the doorman should ever drive
move a guest's car and then only in an emergency; and that it was
not the custom in Denver to permit porters or bellhops to drive
automobiles of guests arriving by automobile. The trial was to the
court, and at the conclusion of all the evidence judgment was en-
tered in favor of the defendant. Held, judgment reversed. A guest
registering at a hotel has no duty to inquire as to the limitations of
an employee's authority. Defendant had vested the uniformed em-
ployee with apparent authority to accept on its behalf the delivery
of the plaintiff's automobile for storage.
= Id. at 572, 290 P.2d at 1111.
o 133 Colo. 166, 292 P.2d 749 (1956).
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